Investigators accuse Onur Simsek and alleged co-conspirators of using a front company to secure government contracts through false representations between 2019 and 2022.
WASHINGTON, DC, October 4, 2026
Federal investigators are seeking Onur Simsek, a Turkish national accused of participating in a military procurement scheme that allegedly concealed where components were manufactured and misrepresented a supplier’s qualifications to obtain United States government contracts.
The FBI added Simsek to its Most Wanted Fraudsters list on September 3, expanding a public search connected to an existing Florida prosecution, while offering up to $150,000 for information leading to his arrest and conviction.
The bureau’s public wanted notice identifies Turkey as his suspected country of residence, although that assessment does not establish his precise location, and the materials reviewed contain no announcement confirming that authorities have apprehended him.
Front Company Allegedly Concealed Manufacturing Arrangements
Investigators allege that Simsek and others used a front company between April 2019 and February 2022, presenting the business to government buyers and military contractors as a vetted manufacturer qualified to supply military components.
According to the FBI, the products were manufactured in Turkey and shipped to the United States, where they were repackaged to remove references to their origin before being supplied under the allegedly misleading contractual representations.
The alleged deception therefore concerned both the supplier’s capabilities and the products delivered, connecting statements used to obtain contracts with the subsequent representations investigators say supported payment for components entering the military supply chain.
The public account does not suggest that Turkish manufacturing alone establishes criminal conduct, because the accusations instead concern allegedly false representations, compliance with required specifications and the related financial and export offenses charged against Simsek.
Testing Raised Questions About Military Components
As FOX 35 Orlando reported, the components were intended for Navy aircraft carriers and submarines, Marine Corps armored vehicles and Army tanks, with investigators saying subsequent testing found that parts failed to satisfy required specifications.
The FBI describes many of the components as critical application items, meaning a failure could potentially leave the larger system inoperable, which is why the investigation encompasses reliability concerns alongside the alleged misuse of procurement funds.
Those concerns describe potential consequences rather than documented operational losses, and the sources reviewed do not identify a particular military accident, injury or disabled weapons platform resulting from the components at issue in this case.
Overseas Payments Form Part of the Allegations
Investigators also allege that hundreds of thousands of dollars were laundered to Turkey through international transfers, adding a financial dimension to the accusations concerning the company’s representations and the origin of the military components supplied.
That description does not establish the total value of every contract associated with the alleged scheme, nor does it provide a final calculation of government losses, recovered funds or the amount Simsek allegedly retained personally.
A federal warrant issued in the Middle District of Florida on October 25, 2023, concerns charges including fraud conspiracies, wire fraud, money laundering and export control offenses, according to the bureau’s published account of the prosecution.
Earlier Contracting Restriction Cited by Authorities
In its September announcement, the FBI quoted federal officials saying Simsek had been barred from government contracting in 2018, a restriction that predates the period investigators identify for the alleged front-company operation and military supply transactions.
Officials from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the General Services Administration’s inspector general also participated in the announcement, emphasizing concerns about contractor certifications, product quality, and protecting federal purchasing resources from alleged fraud.
The earlier contracting restriction provides context for the government’s account, while the pending charges still require their own evidentiary basis and should not be treated as proven solely because authorities describe prior misconduct or sanctions.
Wanted Listing Expands an Existing Search
The September publicity represents a new stage in an older case, with the alleged conduct ending in 2022 and the warrant issued in 2023, well before Simsek’s addition to the bureau’s dedicated fraudsters list.
His suspected presence in Turkey gives the search an international dimension, but the announcements reviewed do not confirm a foreign detention, a completed extradition request or a scheduled transfer to face the outstanding American charges.
International Documentation Is a Separate Planning Issue
For readers considering lawful relocation, Amicus International Consulting publishes information about second-passport services, a separate planning subject from the manufacturer qualifications, product specifications and representations to government purchasers that form the basis of the allegations discussed here.
Its information about tax identification numbers concerns administrative documentation, and the reviewed reporting provides no evidence connecting the company or those services with Simsek, the alleged front company or the disputed military supply contracts.
Authorities Continue Seeking Information
The FBI continues to solicit information about Simsek through its established reporting channels, while any confirmed apprehension and subsequent court proceedings would provide the next substantive developments in a case that remains unresolved in the public materials reviewed.